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Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence E Katz 
Earnings inequality increased substantially in the United States in the 1980s, 
and the real earnings of many groups of workers, primarily men, fell from the 
early 1970s through the early 1990s. In 1993, about 16 percent of the nation’s 
year-round, full-time workers were labeled as low-wage workers by  the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, earning less than the poverty level for a family of 
four ($13,483 per year in 1993 dollars)-an  increase of approximately 33 per- 
cent over the 12 percent who had low earnings in 1979. Less educated young 
men suffered unprecedented losses in real earnings. Despite their costing em- 
ployers less, however, these men were less likely to work at any point in time 
than in the past. In short, in the  1980s, if not earlier, the U.S. labor market 
experienced a massive twist against the less skilled and lower paid that reduced 
their living standards. 
Was the twist in the job market against less educated workers unique to the 
United States, or was it part of a general pattern of decline in the well-being 
of the less skilled in advanced countries? Does it mark a new era in modem 
economic development-a  reversal of the broad finding that income inequality 
tends to fall with modem economic growth? Have other countries avoided or 
ameliorated the rise in wage inequality that characterized the United States? 
Motivated by  these and related questions concerning the rise in inequality 
in the United States, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) un- 
dertook the research project the results of which are presented in this volume. 
We  asked  US. and  European  economists  to  examine  wage  patterns  and 
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changes in various countries for the purpose of enlightening the U.S. discus- 
sion about the increase in inequality in our country. Much of the research re- 
ports on the results obtained from computerized files on the earnings and em- 
ployment of tens of thousands of workers in other countries. While the foreign 
surveys are not identical to the US. Current Population Survey (CPS), which 
most U.S. studies use to document changes in our wage structure and income 
distribution, the data from other countries are sufficiently  similar to permit 
valid comparisons of changes in inequality across countries and, in most cases, 
of differences in wage patterns and inequality as well. 
There are two basic ways to analyze economic patterns across  countries. 
One approach is to examine developments in a single foreign country that the 
researcher implicitly or explicitly compares to his or her own. The other ap- 
proach is to contrast the situation in a number of countries in a single study. 
Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. By concentrating on a 
single country, the researcher can explore country-specific developments and 
data sets in depth but faces the danger that generalizations based on such analy- 
ses may not hold up in a broader setting. By examining a set of countries, the 
researcher gains a wider perspective on patterns of change, but at the cost of 
learning less about any single data set or mode of  wage setting in any single 
country. 
The NBER project sought to exploit the benefits of both methodologies by 
combining country-specific studies with broader cross-country studies. Some 
of the papers in this volume focus on the situation in specific countries, with 
the research undertaken by national experts with detailed knowledge of rele- 
vant data sets and of that country’s institutional and market realities. One study, 
for instance, explores the pattern  of  wage  inequality in Italy, a country that 
used a particular form of changing wages, the scala mobile, to reduce inequal- 
ity greatly (Erickson and Ichino, chap. 8). Two studies focus on Sweden, one 
largely empirical (Edin and Holmlund, chap. 9), the other largely theoretical 
(Freeman and Gibbons, chap.  10). One of the big  surprises to emerge from 
these studies was the similarity in patterns of wage change and in wage-setting 
institutions between these two countries, which are not normally classified as 
“kissing cousins” in terms of labor market practices. Another study (Abraham 
and Houseman, chap.  11) examines inequality in Germany, while yet another 
(Kreuger and Pischke, chap. 12) explores the effects of German unification on 
the wage structure in the former East Germany. Finally, one study examines 
wage patterns in the rapidly growing economy of South Korea (Kim and Topel, 
chap. 7). 
Because  the  United  States  has  shared  a  historical  tradition  with  other 
English-speaking countries, our project paid particular attention to the experi- 
ences of  Australia  (Gregory  and Vella,  chap.  6) and  the  United  Kingdom 
(Schmitt, chap. 5; Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower, chap. 1). Australia has 
traditionally  had a wage-setting system that is based  on industrial tribunals 
and that differs substantially from that of the United States, while the United 3  Introduction and Summary 
Kingdom’s labor market relies on a more decentralized approach to wage de- 
termination. While  the  evidence  is a bit  mixed  for Australia,  these  studies 
found increases in inequality  in both countries,  with the rise  in the United 
Kingdom during the 1980s being both quantitatively and qualitatively similar 
to that in the United States. We excluded Canada from this analysis because 
comparisons of the United States and Canada are contained in a separate vol- 
ume (see Card and Freeman 1993). 
Four  of  the  papers  examine  patterns  of  inequality  and  pay  differentials 
across several countries. Abowd and Bognanno (chap. 2) treat managerial com- 
pensation, an issue that continually raises controversy in the United States ow- 
ing to newspaper stories claiming that U.S. executives  are “overpaid”  com- 
pared to their counterparts overseas.  Blau  and Kahn (chap. 3) examine the 
relative pay of  women across countries in the context of the broader level of 
wage inequality within a country. Blanchflower and Oswald (chap. 4) explore 
the striking degree of  similarity in the extent to which the level of  pay nega- 
tively varies with regional (or industry) unemployment in each of ten nations, 
including the United States. Finally, Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower (chap. 
1) examine the evolution of earnings differentials in the United States, Britain, 
France, and Japan  and assess potential  explanations  for the differences  and 
commonalities in the patterns of changes in the wage and employment struc- 
tures of these four nations. 
With studies focused on individual countries as well as cross-country stud- 
ies, we have greater confidence in the findings presented in the volume than 
we would have had were the analyses limited either to individual country stud- 
ies or to cross-country comparisons that could not examine the patterns in a 
single country in depth. 
Finally, the reader will notice that this research project pays considerable 
attention  to labor  market  institutions  as well  as to the  supply-and-demand 
forces that affect wages. The countries covered  in this volume have similar 
advanced market economies  (Korea and East Germany are the exceptions). 
They face much the same shifts in technology, demand, and, with some excep- 
tions, supplies of labor. It is thus natural to look at differences in wage-setting 
and other institutions to account for some of the country differences in wage 
structures and changes in inequality. 
The Main Findings 
In capsule form, the research in this volume goes a long way toward answer- 
ing the question of  whether the substantial rise in earnings inequality in the 
United States since the late 1970s is universal among advanced capitalist econ- 
omies or something more idiosyncratic. The findings also cast important light 
on the likely causes of the evolution of the wage structure and the growth of 
inequality in the United States. 
With respect to the pattern of change in inequality across countries, the re- 4  Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F.  Katz 
search shows that, during the  1980s, the United States and the United King- 
dom-countries  with decentralized  labor markets and systems of  wage set- 
ting-had  exceptional  increases  in  earnings  inequality  and  in  wage 
differentials by skill category. Only in the United States, however, was the rise 
in inequality associated with quite large declines in real wages for low-wage 
workers (even those in year-round,  full-time employment). The huge decline 
in the real earnings of low-paid workers in the United States has been associ- 
ated with sharp increases in family income inequality and growing rates of 
poverty among working families. Most other developed countries had moder- 
ate increases or in some cases effectively no rise in wage inequality, and real 
wages increased in Britain even for low-paid workers. Thus, the rise in inequal- 
ity was especially harmful to low-paid workers in the United States. Neverthe- 
less, most other advanced nations with less increase in wage inequality and 
faster increases in real wages than the United States suffered from much slower 
employment growth and sharper increases in unemploymenthonemployment 
among less educated and young workers (OECD 1994b). 
The key forces behind the rise in inequality  appear to be changes in the 
supply of  and demand for skills: a secular shift in relative labor demand fa- 
voring more educated workers and workers with problem-solving skills com- 
pared to a slowdown in the rate of  growth of  the supply of highly educated 
workers relative to less educated workers. The shift in labor demand appears 
to be driven in part by  skill-biased technological change partially  associated 
with the “computer revolution” and by the growing internationalization of ad- 
vanced industrial economies manifested in expanding trade with newly indus- 
trialized and less developed countries, large trade deficits in durable goods in 
some nations, and increased immigration pressure. Different analysts put dif- 
ferent weights on the role of technology and trade forces as well as other fac- 
tors (e.g., Borjas 1994; Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1992; Bound and Johnson 
1992; Lawrence and Slaughter 1993), but no one can gainsay that demand has 
been moving toward the more educated and more skilled. Shifts in demand 
are, however, fairly similar across countries, with the result that demand forces 
do little to explain country differences in the rise of inequality. 
Hence, we also attribute a substantial role in the rise in inequality and the 
divergence between the United States and other countries to supply factors- 
in particular to the slowdown in the growth of the supply of highly educated 
workers between the 1970s and the 1980s in the United States. In the  1970s, 
rapid growth in the relative supply of highly educated workers (associated with 
the labor market entry of baby-boom cohorts and the rapid expansion of higher 
education  systems)  led  to declining  college  or  university  wage  premiums 
throughout the OECD, despite  increased demand  for these workers.  In the 
1980s, a more sluggish growth of the relative supply of highly educated work- 
ers (partly  associated with the labor market entry of baby-bust cohorts and 
increases in immigration by less educated workers) permitted skill differentials 
to rise and accounts for some of the greater growth of inequality in the United 5  Introduction and Summary 
States. In striking contrast, the pattern of continued rapid educational upgrad- 
ing in Korea was associated with a large drop in educational wage differentials 
(Kim and Topel, chap. 7). 
The research also finds that labor market institutions contribute to the rise 
in inequality  in two ways. First, differences in  wage-setting institutions and 
in training and education systems explain some of the differential growth of 
inequality. Countries where labor market institutions-unions,  employer fed- 
erations, government agencies-play  a greater role in wage setting and that 
provide better training or education for less skilled workers had smaller rises 
in inequality in response to demandsupply shifts similar to those affecting the 
United States (Abraham and Houseman, chap. 11 ;  Erickson and Ichino, chap. 
8; Edin and Holmlund, chap. 9; and Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower, chap. 
1). Second, changes in labor market institutions contributed to changing wage 
inequality. The decline of unionization contributed to rising wage inequality in 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Centralized wage-setting institu- 
tions weakened in some countries, including Sweden and Italy, lessening the 
forces that reduced inequality. 
Generalizing  from  these  findings,  we  offer  a  supply-demand-institution 
(SDI) explanation of relative wage determination to explain the rise of wage 
inequality in the United States compared to that in other countries. This expla- 
nation attributes differential changes in relative wages and employment among 
countries to long-term shifts in the supply of and demand for more and less 
skilled workers that work themselves out under different and  changing labor 
market institutions. 
There are three parts to this explanation. The first is that shifts in the supply 
of and demand for labor skills substantially alter wage and employment out- 
comes. This requires that shifts affect the wages and employment of different 
groups of  workers in the manner predicted by the economists’  supply-and- 
demand,  market-clearing  model.  This  in  turn  means  that  different  demo- 
graphic, education, and skill groups must be imperfect substitutes in produc- 
tion.’ Further, we argue that shifts have their largest effect on young or less 
experienced workers on the active job market as opposed to experienced work- 
ers with  substantial job tenure (Freeman  1976). The studies in  this volume 
show in different ways that changes in relative supply and demand do in fact 
alter relative wages in the expected directions. 
Since developed economies operate in the same world markets with similar 
technology, however, changes in demand move in broadly similar ways across 
countries. Supply changes will diverge more because different countries ex- 
panded their higher education systems at different times, but, even so, the pro- 
portion of the workforce that is highly educated has risen in all advanced coun- 
tries.  Differences in the pattern  of  change in  supply and demand are thus 
1. In technical jargon, the elasticities of complementarity (Hicks’s term for the effect of changes 
in relative quantities on relative factor prices) must be noticeably greater than zero but less than in- 
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unlikely by themselves to explain cross-country variation in changes in wage 
inequality fully. 
The second part of our explanation identifies country differences in wage- 
setting and other labor market institutions (described in detail in the various 
chapters in this volume and in other volumes in the NBER Comparative Labor 
Markets series) as an additional determinant of differing patterns of change in 
inequality. The more centralized a wage-setting system, and the stronger the 
role of  institutions in wage determination, the smaller will be the effect of 
shifts in supply and demand on relative wages, and, as a consequence, the 
greater will be their effect on relative employment. In addition, education and 
training market institutions, which determine the level of workplace skills for 
the less educated and the degree to which more and less educated workers can 
be substituted for one another in production, will also mediate the effect of 
market forces on wages and employment (Lynch 1994). A more egalitarian 
distribution of skills should dampen the effects of market shifts on wages and 
employment.  Finally, social insurance  and income maintenance  institutions 
also affect wage setting by  influencing supply and demand behavior (Blank 
1994). For instance, generous income maintenance or unemployment benefits 
programs that allow workers to remain jobless for a long period can reduce 
their willingness to take low wages to obtain work and thus reduce supply-side 
pressures that generate greater earnings differentials. 
For the third part of our explanation, we turn to how institutional changes 
such as product  market  deregulation  and changes  in unionization  alter the 
wage-setting calculus. In part, forces outside the labor market, such as political 
developments, will  change labor institutions,  but  these institutions  also re- 
spond to shifts in supply and demand. The important institutional changes in 
the 1980s were the decline in trade union power, which was exceptional in the 
United States, and the decentralization of collective bargaining that character- 
ized diverse European countries. Both these developments are likely to pro- 
duce greater earnings differentials. 
We summarize next the dramatic changes in the American wage structure 
that motivated this study and then place these changes in the perspective of the 
developments in other advanced countries. 
The Changes in the United States 
As a starting point for examining what happened in other countries, we sum- 
marize the facts about changes in the U.S. wage and employment structure in 
the 1980s. Many researchers using several data sources-including  household 
survey data from the CPS, other household  surveys, and establishment  sur- 
veys-have  documented that wage inequality and skill differentials in earnings 
and employment increased sharply in the United States (Bound and Johnson 
1992; Davis and Haltiwanger  1991; Gottschalk and Moffitt 1992; Katz and 
Murphy 1992; Levy and Murnane 1992; Murphy and Welch 1992). The finding 7  Introduction and Summary 
that inequality increased is not sensitive to the choice of data set, sample, or 
wage measure. The following four “facts” summarize the changes in the Amer- 
ican wage and employment structure that give us a benchmark for assessing 
the labor market performance of other countries: 
Fact I. From the late  1970s to the early  1990s, wage dispersion  increased 
dramatically for both men and women, reaching levels of wage inequality for 
men that are probably greater than at any time since 1940. The hourly earnings 
of a full-time worker in the ninetieth percentile of the U.S. earnings distribu- 
tion relative to a worker in the tenth percentile grew by approximately 20 per- 
cent for men and 25 percent for women from 1979 to 1989. The gap increased 
further in the early 1990s. This pattern of rising wage inequality was not offset 
by changes in fringe benefits favoring the less skilled2  or by improvements in 
their chances of holding a job relative to those of more educated  worker^.^ It 
marks a worsening in the economic well-being of lower-paid workers. 
Fact 2. Pay  differentials  by  education  and  age increased. The collegehigh 
school wage  premium  doubled  for young  workers  as the  weekly  wages of 
young male college graduates increased by some 30 percent relative to those 
of young males with twelve or fewer years of schooling. In addition, among 
workers without college degrees, the average wages of older workers increased 
relative to those of  younger workers. Only the gender differential  declined. 
The earnings of women increased by 10  percent or more relative to men in all 
education and age groups in the 1980s. 
Fact 3. Wage dispersion increased within demographic and skill groups. The 
wages of individuals of the same age, education, and sex, working in the same 
industry  and occupation,  were  more unequal  at the  end of  the  1980s than 
twenty years earlier. Much of this increase took the form of greater wage differ- 
entials for “similar” workers across establishments in the same industry. 
Fact 4. Since these changes were coterminous with sluggish overall real wage 
growth, the real earnings of the less educated and lower paid fell compared to 
the earnings of analogous individuals a decade earlier. Most striking, the real 
2. To the contrary, the same less skilled men who suffered losses in real earnings experienced 
losses in the likelihood that they would have an employer- or union-provided pension (Even and 
MacPherson  1994) and  would  be  covered  by  an  employer  health  insurance  plan  (Acs and 
Steuerle 1993). 
3. Despite the decline in the relative wages of  less skilled men, the proportion employed fell 
relative to the proportion employed of more skilled men. This occurred by education and by deciles 
of the earnings distribution (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman  1990; Topel 1993). But note that, 
during the early 1990s, white-collar workers suffered more from unemployment than in the past. 
The unemployment rate of  executives in January  1993 was  3.9 percent, the highest it had been 
since 1983 (4.4 percent). By contrast, the unemployment rate of operators, fabricators, and labor- 
ers was 11.9 percent in January 1993, compared to 20.6 percent in 1983. 8  Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F.  Katz 
hourly wages of young men with twelve or fewer years of schooling dropped 
by  some 20 percent from 1979 to 1989 and continued declining in the early 
1990s. In fact, the real hourly earnings of the median male worker appear to 
have declined since the end of the 1970~.~ 
Like most research on the widening distribution of earnings, this list of facts 
presents the evidence in terms of statistical measures of earnings distributions. 
But the same data can be organized in another way,  one that some find more 
appealing: as changes in the share of jobs that provide “middle-class” earnings. 
For instance, rather than reporting the ratio of the wages for the ninetieth and 
tenth percentile workers, one can report the proportion of  workers with in- 
comes that fall in a fixed “middle-class” income band around the mean. Since 
the “jobs” measure of the change in the labor market is based on the same data 
as income distribution measures, it is likely to tell the same story5  When the 
distribution of  earnings widens,  there  should be  a decline in  the  share of 
middle-class  jobs in the total; conversely, when there is a decline in the propor- 
tion of middle-class jobs, the earnings distribution should widen. Gregory and 
Vella’s study (chap. 6) focuses largely on the jobs measure of inequality, which 
they  find has worsened in Australia as in the United States, consistent with 
measures showing a widening earnings distribution. 
Did the changes that took place in the 1980s break with the past or continue 
earlier trends? Figure 1 graphs the relative hourly wages for full-time workers 
from the March CPS from  1967 to 1989 to answer this question. The figure 
shows that the  1980s changes are largely a break with the past. The college 
wage premium plotted in panel A did not trend upward for decades. It in- 
creased modestly from 1967 to 1971, then fell through 1979, before jumping 
sharply in the 1980s, especially for the youngest workers. 
Returns to experience graphed in panel B increased greatly for less educated 
men in the 1980s but not in previous years. The rise in the experience differen- 
tial is, however, limited to the less educated; the earnings of male college grad- 
uates show no marked shift in favor of older or more experienced workers. 
The reduction in the gender gap was also a 1980s development. Differentials 
in pay between women and men changed little in the 1960s and 1970s, then 
narrowed substantially from 1979 to 1990 (panel C). 
The one change that began prior to the 1980s was the rise in within-group 
wage inequality for men. Panel D shows that, even after controlling for educa- 
tion and experience, the differential in earnings between men in the ninetieth 
4. Information on U.S. wage trends through 1993 can be found in Mishel and Bernstein (1994). 
5. Because earnings distributions can be altered in various ways, there is no one-to-one corre- 
spondence between all measures of change in the distribution and the change in the share of jobs 
in specified earnings categories. For instance, it is possible that the proportion of workers earning 
middle-class incomes remained unchanged while the very poor got poorer (reducing the earnings 
of the tenth percentile) and the very rich richer (raising the earnings of the ninetieth percentile). 
But observed changes in the distribution have not followed such a pattern. 9  Introduction and Summary 
percentile and those in the tenth percentile began to increase in the early 1970s. 
We note, however, that an analysis of usual hourly earnings in the CPS does 
not show this trend beginning until the 1980s (Card and Lemieux 1994; Mishel 
and Bernstein 1994). 
Changes in Other Advanced OECD Countries 
Did earnings differentials and overall wage inequality rise in other advanced 
countries as they did in the United States, or is rising inequality unique to the 
United States? 
To answer this question, we summarize the analyses in this volume and else- 
where that gathered comparable data for many countries. The data come from 
diverse country sources, ranging from CPS-style household surveys, to estab- 
lishment surveys, to surveys comparable to the U.S. Survey of Consumer Fi- 
nances. While most of  the analyses use micro-data files, in some cases these 
data were unavailable (Japan does not make public its basic data files), and the 
figures are limited to published data. Virtually all the data sets measure earn- 
ings before taxes. 
There are, of course, numerous noncomparabilities among data sets for vari- 
ous countries (as there also often are for different data sets for the same coun- 
try). Definitions of education and occupation groups differ depending on edu- 
cation  and training  systems  and  data-gathering  procedures.  Sample survey 
coverage and measures of earnings differ. The meaning of earnings also differs 
across countries. In the United States, living standards depend largely on per- 
sonal earnings, whereas many European countries provide elements of  com- 
pensation to all citizens or workers, such as health insurance, that Americans 
must buy with their take-home pay or through nonwage workplace compensa- 
tion. Most other countries also have child allowances, among other benefits. If 
everyone in a foreign country has benefits that Americans buy  through  pay, 
measures of inequality based on wages will overstate inequality in that country 
compared to the United States. Differences in the progressivity of tax-transfer 
systems also vary across countries and affect the way  in which differences in 
before-tax earnings translate into economic well-being and the use of noneam- 
ings compensation.  For instance, firms are more likely to give in-kind pay- 
ments to workers,  such as company cars, subsidies on transportation, lunch, 
and so on, in countries with high marginal rates. Abowd and Bognanno (chap. 
2) explain part of the seemingly high compensation of executives in the United 
States as a result of relatively low marginal taxes, which favor direct compen- 
sation as opposed to unmeasured perquisites. 
Differences in data and modes of pay make cross-country comparisons dif- 
ficult. But they do not make such comparisons impossible or meaningless. In 
many cases, researchers know how reporting practices or definitions vary and 
can adjust results for these differences or, if that is not possible, specify the 
direction of bias in measures of inequality relative to the United States. More 10  Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F.  Katz 
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important, in terms of  changes over time, differences in definitions and re- 
porting procedures that are constant over time are unlikely to distort trends 
in inequality. 
Table  1 categorizes countries by  the way  their educational or occupational 
wage differentials changed in the 1970s and 1980s. From the late 1960s to the 
late 1970s, all the countries shared a common pattern of narrowing educational 
and occupational wage differentials. In addition, all saw the trend toward re- 
duced educational wage differentials and a more compressed wage structure 
end by the early to mid-1980s. 
In  the 1980s, however, educational differentials moved  differently among 
countries. In several countries, the differentials rose, but at more modest rates 
than in the United States (Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower, chap. 1 in this 11  Introduction and Summary 
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volume; Edin and Holmlund, chap. 9 in this volume; Freeman and Needels 
1993; Abraham and Houseman, chap. 11 in this volume; Erickson and Ichino, 
chap. 8 in this volume; Gregory and Vella, chap. 6 in this volume; and OECD 
1993). The one country with a pattern of widening wage differentials quantita- 
tively similar to that of the United States is Great Britain. Canada, Australia, 
Japan, and Sweden had small increases in educational differentials beginning 
in the early  1980s, and the Canadian rise appears to have at least partially 
reversed itself in the late  1980s (Bar-Or et al. 1992; MacPhail  1993). Wage 
differentials continued to narrow in Italy and France through the mid-l980s, 
with some hint of expanding differentials in the late 1980s. There is no evi- 
dence of  rising educational differentials during the  1980s in West Germany 
and the Netherlands and only slight evidence of an increase in Australia. The 
only  country  where  educationalloccupational  differentials  widened  by  an 
amount similar to that in the United States was Great Britain. 12  Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F.  Katz 
Table 1  Changes in EducationaUOccupational Wage Differentials in 
Selected Countries 
Countries That Experienced:  1970s  1980s 
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A large rise in differentials 
Table 2 measures changes in inequality in terms of the log of the ratio of the 
earnings of the top decile to those of the bottom decile from 1979 to 1990 (or 
the latest year available). The data show that the United States and the United 
Kingdom had by far the biggest increases in inequality. But there is a difference 
between the pattern of change in wages in the United Kingdom and that in 
the United States. In the United Kingdom, real earnings for all workers rose 
noticeably, with the result that, despite greater inequality, the real earnings for 
those at the bottom of the distribution grew (Katz, Loveman, and Blanchflower, 
chap. 1; Schmitt, chap. 5). By contrast, in the United States, real earnings at 
the bottom of the earnings distribution fell sharply. From 1979 to  1989, the 
real earnings of lower-decile American males dropped by  11-17  percent (de- 
pending on the survey used) compared to an increase in the real earnings of 
lower-decile British males of  12 percent. 
That low-wage workers need not suffer losses in economic well-being even 
when inequality rises is also shown in the pattern of change in Japan. Inequal- 
ity rose somewhat in Japan in the  1980s, but economic growth was  so rapid 
that the living standards of  the low-paid workers improved immensely. From 
1979 to 1989, the real earnings of the tenth percentile Japanese male employee 
increased by more than 40 percent-an  increase that exceeded that of  the nine- Table 2  Wage Inequality for Full-Time Workers, Selected OECD Countries, 
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Austria  1.21  ...  1.24  1.26  .05 
Canada  1.32  1.46  ...  1.38  .06 
Sweden  .53  .57  .56  .60  .07 
Sweden, all  ...  .66  ...  .73  .06 
Sweden, blue collar  .30  .30  .31  .35  .05 
Denmark  .76  .77  .79  .77  .01 
Men and women: 
Norway  .72  ...  .77  .68  -  .04 
Sources: The data for the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan are from Blanch- 
flower, Katz, and Loveman (chap. 1 in this volume); the data for Germany are from Abraham and 
Houseman (chap. 11 in this volume); the data for Sweden are from Edin and Holmlund (chap. 9 
in this volume); the data for Italy are from Erickson and Ichino (chap. 8 in this volume); and the 
data for the Netherlands are from Hartog, Oosterbeek, and Teulings (1992). The data for the other 
countries are from OECD (1993, table 5.2,  p.  159). 
"he  samples consist of full-time workers, with the exception of Japan. The wage inequality mea- 
sures for Japan refer to regular workers. Wages are measured by  hourly earnings for the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden; weekly earnings for 
full-year, full-time workers covered by the social security system for Germany I; and gross average 
monthly earnings plus holiday allowances based on data from the German socioeconomic panel 
for Germany 11.  The data for Canada and Italy are for annual earnings of year-round, full-time 
workers. The data for Australia cover weekly earnings and for Austria monthly earnings. 
bCategory  I is 1979, except in the following cases, where we recorded 1980 data for Austria (men; 
women), Denmark (men and women), and Norway (men and women) and 1981 data for Canada 
(men; women) and Sweden (men; women). 
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Table 2  (continued) 
Category I1 is 1984, except in the following cases, where we recorded  1983 data for Germany I 
(men), 1985 data for Australia (men; women), Sweden (men; women), and Denmark (men and 
women), and 1986 data for Canada (men; women). 
dCategory I11  is  1987, except in the following cases, where we recorded  1988 data for Canada 
(men) and Sweden (men; women). 
‘Category IV is  1990, except in the following cases, where we recorded  1988 data for Germany 
(men), 1989 data for Austria (men; women), and 1991 data for Sweden (men; women) and Norway 
(men and women). 
‘French data for 1990 are provisional updates from the OECD. 
This change is the sum of Germany I from the period  1979-83  and Germany I1  from the period 
1984-88. 
tieth percentile American  male worker. Japan accomplished widely  shared, 
rapid  real  wage  growth  while  maintaining  relatively  low  unemployment 
throughout the 1980s-although  this pattern has been somewhat disturbed by 
the deep Japanese recession of  the early 1990s. 
We conclude that less educated and lower-paid American workers suffered 
the largest real wage decline among advanced OECD countries. The erosion 
in their economic well-being, in turn, produced the highest level of  inequality 
of earnings among advanced countries and the seemingly anomalous situation 
in which low-paid Americans made less in purchasing power parity units than 
low-paid workers in other major countries, despite the United States having 
higher living standards on average (Freeman 1994). 
What about workers at the top of the earnings distribution? Chief executive 
officers (CEOs) in America are paid more than CEOs in other countries, even 
after adjusting for differences in modes of pay, such as the use of various fringe 
benefits, according to Abowd and Bognanno (chap. 2). The advantage of CEOs 
over manufacturing operatives rose in the 1980s. But the American pay advan- 
tage appears limited to CEOs. Differences in pay between high-level managers 
and operatives do not differ noticeably between the United States and other 
major OECD countries. 
Did the relative earnings of women improve in other countries as they did in 
the United States? Figure 2 shows that the gap between men’s earnings and 
women’s earnings declined in most countries in the period under investigation. 
Given the widening of the overall earnings distribution and the historical con- 
centration of women in the bottom part of the distribution, the reduction in the 
male-female  wage gap in the United  States in particular  was a  significant 
achievement. 
Why the United States and Other Countries Did Differently 
Can international differences in changes in relative wages in the 1980s be 
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Fig. 2  Female-to-male  hourly earnings ratios 
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ity increase more in the United States (and the United Kingdom) than in most 
other advanced countries? 
Labor demand factors do not explain much  of  the differential growth of 
wage inequality or educational earnings differentials among countries in the 
1980s. All advanced countries experienced large, steady shifts in the industrial 
and occupational structure of employment toward sectors and job categories 
that use a greater proportion  of more educated workers (Katz  1994; OECD 
1994b). The share of employment in manufacturing declined everywhere ex- 
cept Japan.  In  the  United  States, the  manufacturing  share of  employment 
dropped by 4.2 percentage points from 1979 to 1989; in OECD-Europe, it fell 
by  4.1 percentage points. Only Japan’s massive export success enabled it to 
maintain a near constant manufacturing  share of  employment. Still, even in 
Japan, changes in technology and the internationalization of economic compe- 
tition shifted labor demand in favor of more educated workers and against non- 
college-educated workers. 
Differential growth in the supply of workers by  level of education, by con- 
trast, contributed  to the greater rise in educational wage differentials in  the 
United States than in other countries in the 1980s. In the  1970s, despite shifts 
in labor demand favoring more educated workers, educational  differentials 
narrowed in all advanced  countries at least partially  because expansion  of 
higher  education  systems and high returns to education produced  large in- 
creases in the supply of highly educated workers. In the  1980s, by  contrast, 
while the educational qualifications of workers trended upward in all countries, 
the growth of the college-educated workforce decelerated in the United States. 
Among young American men, the college graduate share of the workforce ac- 
tually fell over several years. 
For differences in the growth of the relative supply of the educated to aEect 
earnings differentials in this manner, it is necessary that changes in their rela- 
tive supply affect relative wages within countries. The limited time-series evi- 
dence available for the  United  States (Katz  and Murphy  1992; Blackburn, 
Bloom, and Freeman  1990), Canada (Freeman and Needels  1993), Sweden 
(Edin and Holmlund, chap. 9 in this volume), the Netherlands (Teulings 1992), 
Britain (Schmitt, chap. 5 in this volume), and South Korea (Kim and Topel, 
chap. 7 in this volume) shows such a relation. In fact, holding fixed proxies for 
the growth of demand, the estimates show that a 10 percent  increase in the 
relative supply of educated workers lowers relative pay by 3-7  percent in vari- 
ous countries-as  similar a magnitude as one might expect from studies that 
use various types of data, covering different time periods, and from countries 
with different wage-setting institutions. 
The cross-country pattern of changes in educational wage differentials ap- 
pears fairly consistent with this interpretation. Countries with at least modest 
increases in skill differentials by the end of the decade-the  United States, the 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Australia, and Japan-experienced  some decline 
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cational differentials did not expand in the 1980s-France,  Germany, and the 
Netherlands-essentially  maintained their 1970s rate of growth of supply of 
more educated  workers  into the  1980s (Katz, Loveman,  and  Blanchflower, 
chap. 1 in this volume; Abraham and Houseman, chap. 11 in this volume; Teu- 
lings 1992; Hartog, Oosterbeek, and Teulings  1992; OECD 1993). Addition- 
ally, the continued rapid expansion in Canada helps explain the much more 
modest increase in educational  differentials there than in the United  States 
(Freeman and Needels 1993). 
Finally, South Korea provides a striking example of the effect of  relative 
supply changes in determining educational differentials (Kim and Topel, chap. 
7). In the  1980s, South Korea saw a huge drop in the advantage of college 
graduates over less educated workers. Why? A major reason was that South 
Korea experienced  an exceptionally fast growth in the college  share of the 
workforce. Unlike any other developing country or most developed countries, 
South Korea has moved rapidly toward levels of college education among its 
young people approaching those found in the United States and Japan. 
In sum, the supply-and-demand forces affected educational earnings differ- 
entials within countries. Given comparable changes in demand across coun- 
tries, differences in the growth of relative supply help account for country dif- 
ferences in the growth of skill differentials. Still, they cannot explain the bulk 
of country differences in levels or changes in inequality. Differences in labor 
market institutions among countries and changes in those institutions in the 
1980s also influenced the pattern of  wage inequality. 
Wage-Setting Institutions and Changes in Institutions 
There are many ways to categorize wage-setting institutions. Most analysts 
concentrate on the degree of centralization of wage setting, differentiating be- 
tween countries like the United States, with its highly decentralized labor mar- 
ket, where hundreds of thousands of firms bargain with employees or unions 
over pay and working conditions with little government intervention, and the 
more  centralized  wage-setting  systems  of  Western  Europe.  But  European 
wage-setting systems differ greatly among themselves. Until recently, for in- 
stance, peak-level  union  confederations  and employer federations in Austria 
and  Sweden have historically bargained over national  wage settlements that 
cover much of  the workforce but that  allow local parties to increase wages 
above national settlements through “wage drift” (Freeman and Gibbons, chap. 
10). In  Germany, industry or regional collective bargaining determines basic 
wages for an area, and the Ministry of Labor often extends those settlements 
to all workers and firms, including those who did not participate in the bar- 
gaining. In France, the minimum wage is important in determining the overall 
level of wages, and the French Ministry of Labor also extends contracts. In 
Italy, the scala mobile, a form of negotiated wage increase that is designed to 
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the pay of low-paid workers faster than that of high-paid  workers throughout 
much of the 1980s (Erickson and Ichino, chap. 8). 
Ranking these institutions in terms of the degree to which they centralize 
wage setting is difficult. Some experts place Germany high on a centralization 
scale (Bruno and Sachs 1985), others lower (Calmfors and Driffil 1988). Al- 
though few view Italy as having highly centralized wage-setting  institutions, 
Italy’s scalu mobile resembles Sweden’s peak-level bargaining system. Coun- 
tries that change wage-setting practices-as  Australia did in  1983, when  its 
unions agreed to an accord with the government to limit wage increases so that 
employment would grow, and as Sweden did when it stepped back from na- 
tional bargaining in the  1980s-create  further classification problems. How- 
ever, these problems notwithstanding,  one thing is clear about international 
differences in labor institutions: the position of the United States. 
No matter which factors one stresses in categorizing countries, the United 
States ranks low in the role played by institutions in wage setting and high in 
the role played by  market forces. In contrast to European countries or even 
Canada, whose unions remain strong, the United States has few institutions to 
augment or alter market wage setting. Unionization is low. Employer federa- 
tions are weak. The government rarely intervenes to set wages. Since institu- 
tional forces tend to dampen inequality, wage inequality ought to be higher in 
the United States than in most other countries, as it is. By allowing the full 
brunt of shifts in supply and demand to fall on wages in the 1980s,  when those 
shifts operated against the low skilled and lower paid, the United States could 
be expected to have especially large drops in the relative earnings of less edu- 
cated workers, as it did. In Western European countries, by contrast, explicit 
government and union policies dampened pressures for increased wage differ- 
entials in the 1980s. 
Finally, there were important changes in wage-setting institutions in OECD 
countries in the  1980s that affected wage differentials. After growing in the 
1970s in many countries (but not in the United States), unionization  fell in 
many countries in the 1980s (OECD 1991). The union share of the workforce 
dropped precipitously in the United Kingdom, the United States, the Nether- 
lands, and  France but held  steady  in Canada and Germany. Because union 
membership does not have the same meaning in different labor relations set- 
tings, however, even similar declines in density have different effects on the 
labor market.  In the United States and the United Kingdom, reduced union 
density  meant  a  decreased  role  for  collective  bargaining  and  institutional 
forces in wage setting. But, in France, falling unionization did not diminish the 
importance of the national minimum wage in wage setting, and it was accom- 
panied by an increasing number of plant-level collective contracts. Sweden and 
Austria make another  striking contrast. In Sweden, union density has been 
exceptionally high, whereas density has fallen sharply in Austria. Yet Swedish 
employers withdrew from peak-level bargaining in 1983, moving to end Swe- 
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ized wage setting throughout the decade. Estimates by the OECD show that 
the percentage  of  the workforce  covered by  collective bargaining contracts, 
which is presumably the route by which unions affect wages, changed differ- 
ently  than  the  percentage  unionized  in  many  European  countries  (OECD 
1994a). 
Weakened unionism and reduced centralization of wage setting contributed 
to the cross-country pattern of change in wage inequality in the 1980s. In the 
United Kingdom, the fall in union density accounts for about one-quarter of 
the  growth of  wage  inequality  among males  (Schmitt,  chap.  5 in  this  vol- 
ume)-comparable  to the estimated effect of declining density in the United 
States (Card 1992; Freeman 1993).  At the other end of the spectrum, the con- 
tinued  strength of  unions  in  Canada partly  explains the  smaller increase in 
inequality in Canada than in the United States. Approximately 40 percent of 
the difference in wage inequality between the United States and Canada ap- 
pears to be due to differences in union density (Lemieux 1993).  The decentral- 
ization of collective bargaining in Sweden helps explain the rise in inequality 
in that  country in the  1980s, although levels of  inequality are quite modest 
indeed by  U.S.  standards. The unification of East and West Germany moved 
the East German wage structure toward that of the West (Krueger and Pischke, 
chap. 12). 
This discussion has treated institutional changes as exogenous to the labor 
market. But institutions are not immune to market forces. Economic forces 
that raise relative wages are likely to lead to less centralized collective bar- 
gaining or a reduction in union influence on wage setting (Freeman and Gib- 
bons, chap. 10). Institutions that go strongly against market forces face a diffi- 
cult task. That Italy dropped its scala mobile, Sweden abandoned peak-level 
bargaining, and other countries moved  toward more plant- or firm-level ar- 
rangements in an era when the market moved toward greater differentials  is 
presumably no accident. There is space for institutions to affect outcomes, but 
that space is limited. The European countries that had small rises in inequality 
in the  1980s may see greater rises as their institutions either adapt to market 
forces or are altered by those forces. Still, we expect few if any of these coun- 
tries, save the United Kingdom, to approach U.S. levels of inequality, as long 
as they continue to give greater sway to institutional forces in wage setting than 
does the United States. 
Conclusion: Leaning against the Wind 
Market incentives for increased investments in education appear to be play- 
ing some role in helping ameliorate the huge rise in inequality in the United 
States. The sharp expansion of the college wage premium in the  1980s has 
been associated with a large increase in college enrollment rates from 49 per- 
cent of new  high school graduates in  1980 to over 60  percent  in the early 
1990s, despite  rapidly  rising  tuition  costs (U.S.  Department  of  Education 20  Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F.  Katz 
1994). This change promises accelerated growth of the relative supply of col- 
lege graduates in the future, which will, in turn, act to offset somewhat contin- 
ued demand increases favoring the more educated.6 
Will an increase in the rate of growth of the relative supply of more educated 
workers be enough to prevent further increases in educational wage differen- 
tials and help restore an economic future to less educated American workers? 
Given continued technological and trade changes favoring the more educated, 
we doubt that increasing the supply of college graduates and reducing that of 
less educated workers will by itself undo the rise in inequality of the  1980s. 
But the experiences of other advanced nations suggest additional ways to lean 
against the wind of increased inequality and improve the economic well-being 
of the lower paid. 
Two broad strategies were associated with little increase in skill differentials 
and in overall wage inequality in the 1980s. The first was the European model 
of greater institutional influence in wage setting through increases in minimum 
wages and extensions of the terms of collective bargaining agreements to firms 
not directly involved in such agreements. Strategies of this type succeeded in 
preventing the wage structures from widening (at least through the mid- 1980s) 
in Italy and France. But by themselves these policies do not deal directly with 
the changing demand for skills, and they can run into economic difficulties in 
the long run. Policies that limit market wage adjustments without addressing 
changed labor market conditions can prevent wage inequality, but they risk 
stagnant employment growth, persistent unemployment for young workers (as 
in France), andor a shift of  resources to an underground economy to avoid 
wage regulations (as in Italy). 
The second type of  national  strategy  combines institutional  wage setting 
with  education  and  training  systems  that  invest  heavily  in  non-college- 
educated workers. Germany and Japan are typically viewed  as the exemplar 
countries  here.  German  and Japanese  firms  treat college-  and  non-college- 
educated  workers as much closer substitutes in production  than  do U.S. or 
British firms. Technology and trade shocks do not generate as much pressure 
for wage structure changes in these countries since workers  are not sharply 
differentiated by skill. Germany and Japan appeared fairly successful through 
much  of  the  1980s in  maintaining  the  earnings  and  employment  of  non- 
college-educated workers. German institutions constrain wage setting, but they 
also offer apprenticeships and further training opportunities that try to make 
supply consistent with wage policies. The Japanese have succeeded with solid 
6. The small size of  cohorts entering the US.  labor market in recent years has meant that large 
increases in college enrollment rates have not been associated with a very large acceleration in the 
rate of growth of the relative supply of  more skilled workers. Bound and Johnson (1994) estimate 
that the relative supply of  college-equivalent workers increased only from a 2.9 percent annual 
growth rate over the period  1979-88 to a 3.2 percent rate over the period  1988-92.  In contrast, 
the annual growth rate was 4.2 percent  during the period  1973-79,  one of  a declining college 
wage premium. 21  Introduction and Summary 
basic education and much informal  firm-based training.  Nevertheless, both 
these economies have run into some (at least transitory) problems during the 
early 1990s as personified by sluggish employment growth and rising unem- 
ployment. 
Thus, no nation appears to have found an approach that allows it fully to 
escape increased labor market difficulties for less skilled workers. But interna- 
tional differences in recent labor market experiences strongly suggest that poli- 
cies to buffer the earnings of  the less educated by  institutional wage setting 
work best when accompanied by institutions that augment those workers’ skills 
as well. 
References 
Acs, Gregory, and C. Eugene Steuerle.  1993. Trends in the distribution of  non-wage 
benefits and compensation. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, August. Typescript. 
Bar-Or, Yuval, John Burbidge, Lonnie Magee, and A. Leslie Robb.  1992. Canadian 
experience-earnings profiles and the return to education in Canada: 1971-90. Work- 
ing Paper no. 93-04.  McMaster University, Department of Economics. 
Blackburn, McKinley, David Bloom, and Richard Freeman. 1990. The declining posi- 
tion of less-skilled American males. In A future of lousy  jobs? ed. G.  Burtless. Wash- 
ington, D.C.: Broohngs. 
Blank, Rebecca. 1994. Social protection versus economic jexibiliry. Chicago: Univer- 
sity of Chicago Press. 
Borjas, George. 1994. The internationalization of the U.S. labor market and the wage 
structure. University of California, San Diego, October. Typescript. 
Borjas, George, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence Katz. 1992. On the labor market ef- 
fects of immigration and trade. In Immigration and the work force, ed. G. Borjas and 
R. Freeman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Bound, John, and George Johnson.  1992. Changes in the  structure of  wages in the 
1980s: An  evaluation of  alternative explanations. American Economic Review 82 
(June): 371-92. 
. 1994. What are the causes of rising wage inequality in the US.?  University of 
Michigan, October. Typescript. 
Bruno, Michael, and Jeffrey Sachs. 1985. Economics and worldwide stagflation. Cam- 
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Calmfors, L., and J. Driffil. 1988. Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeco- 
nomic performance. Economic Policy 6 (April): 14-61. 
Card, David. 1992. The effect of unions on the distribution of  wages: Redistribution or 
relabelling. NBER Working Paper no. 4195. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of 
Economic Research, October. 
Card, David, and Richard B. Freeman.  1993. Small differences that matter: Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Card, David, and Thomas Lemieux.  1994. Changing wage structure and black-white 
wage differentials. American Economic Review 84 (May): 29-33. 
Davis, Steven J., and John Haltiwanger. 1991. Wage dispersion within and between 
manufacturing plants.  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 
115-80. 22  Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F.  Katz 
Even, William E., and David A. MacPherson. 1994. Why did male pension coverage 
decline in the 1980s? Industrial and Labor Relations Review 47 (April): 439-53. 
Freeman, Richard B. 1976. The overeducated American. San Diego: Academic. 
. 1993. How much has de-unionization contributed to the rise in male earnings 
inequality? In  Uneven tides: Rising inequality in America, ed. S. Danziger and P. 
Gottschalk. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
. 1994. How labor fares in advanced economies. In  Working under different 
rules, ed. R. Freeman. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Freeman, Richard B., and Karen Needels. 1993. Skill differentials in Canada in an era 
of rising labor market inequality. In Small differences that matteer; ed. D. Card and R. 
Freeman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Gottschalk, Peter, and Robert Moffitt.  1992. Earnings and wage distributions in the 
NLS, CPS, and PSID: Part I of final report to the U.S. Department of Labor. Brown 
University. Typescript. 
Hartog, Joop, Hessel Oosterbeek, and Coen Teulings. 1992. Age, wage, and education 
in the Netherlands. University of Amsterdam. Typescript. 
Katz, Lawrence F.  1994.  Active labor market policies to expand employment and oppor- 
tunity. In Reducing unemployment:  Current issues and policy options. Kansas City, 
Mo.: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
Katz, Lawrence F., and Kevin M. Murphy. 1992. Changes in relative wages, 1963-1987: 
Supply and demand factors. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 107 (February): 35-78. 
Lawrence, Robert Z., and Matthew Slaughter. 1993. Trade and U.S. wages in the 1980s: 
Giant  sucking  sound  or  large  hiccup?  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity: 
Microeconomics, no. 2: 161-226. 
Lemieux, Thomas. 1993. Unions and wage inequality in Canada and the United States. 
In Small differences that matteer; ed. D. Card and R. Freeman. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Levy, Frank, and Richard Murnane. 1992. U.S. earnings levels and earnings inequality: 
A review of recent trends and proposed explanations. Journal of  Economic Literature 
30 (September): 1333-8 1. 
Lynch, Lisa M. 1994. Training and the private sector  Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
MacPhail, Fiona. 1993. Has the “great U-turn” gone full circle? Recent trends in earn- 
ings inequality in Canada, 1981-1989.  Working Paper no. 93-01.  Dalhousie Univer- 
sity, Department of Economics, January. 
Mishel, Lawrence, and Jared Bernstein. 1994. The state of working America, 1994-95. 
Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute. 
Murphy, Kevin M., and Finis Welch. 1992. The structure of wages. Quarterly Journal 
of  Economics 107 (February): 285-326. 
OECD. 1991. Employment outlook. Paris. 
. 1993. Employment outlook. Paris. 
. 1994a. Employment outlook. Paris. 
. 1994b. The OECD jobs study. Paris. 
Teulings, Coen. 1992. The wage distribution in a model of matching between wages 
Topel, Robert. 1993. What have we learned from empirical studies of  unemployment 
US.  Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics. 1994. The con- 
and jobs. University of Amsterdam, October. Typescript. 
and turnover? American Economic Review 83 (May): 110-15. 
dition of  education, 1994. Washington, D.C.: US.  Government Printing Office. 